We find that small business credit scoring (SBCS) is associated with expanded quantities, higher average prices, and greater average risk levels for small business credits under $100,000, after controlling for bank size and other differences across banks. We also find that: (1) bank-specific and industry learning curves are important; (2) SBCS effects differ for banks that adhere to "rules" versus "discretion" in using the technology; and (3) SBCS effects differ for larger credits. The data do not support two alternative explanations of the main results under which the findings primarily represent statistical artifacts, rather than significant changes in lending behavior.
SBCS AND RELATED LITERATURE
SBCS is a relatively new technology for small business lending that involves processing data about the firm and its owner using statistical methods. 1 It is based on a score, or summary statistic about the applicant's expected future loan performance (Feldman, 1997 , Mester, 1997 . Although credit scores have been used for some time in the underwriting of consumer loans, this technology has only recently been applied to small commercial credits, which have nonstandardized documentation and were thought to be too heterogeneous (Rutherford 1994 (Rutherford /1995 . The key innovation is the use of the personal credit history of small business owner, which is highly predictive of the loan repayment prospects of the business. 2 The personal information used in SBCS models may include the owner's monthly income, outstanding debt, financial assets, employment tenure, home ownership, and previous loan defaults or delinquencies (Mester 1997) . The personal information is obtained from one or more consumer credit bureaus and combined with business data collected by the bank and in some cases commercial credit bureaus to enter into the prediction model. 3 While some large banks have developed proprietary SBCS models (e.g., Wells Fargo), most have turned to outside vendors. The largest external provider, Fair, Isaac and Company, introduced its first SBCS model in 1995. The model used a sample of more than 5000 small business loan applications over five years from 17 large U.S. banks designed to represent a national pool. 4 Many banks began to adopt SBCS following the introduction of the first Fair, Isaac model. Today, there are alternative external vendors that are typically also in the commercial credit information business (e.g., Dun and Bradstreet, Experian). In the future, SBCS may be encouraged by regulatory changes. Under currently proposed Basle II international capital standards that would apply to the largest U.S. banking organizations, small business loans issued under credit scoring would receive relatively favorable treatment as retail exposures (i.e., have lower capital requirements), whereas other small business loans may be treated less favorably as corporate exposures.
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SBCS products also vary considerably in the amount and type of information they require and in the way the lender accesses them. For example, the business data entered by the lender may be as little as an SIC code and checking account balance all the way up to and including extensive financial statement information. The credit scores may be accessed through desktop software on a personal computer, via mainframe server, or over the Internet. While these models may be designed for use for credits up to $250K, many lenders use them only for amounts less than $100K. Vendors typically charge a fee for each score, as opposed to a flat fee for the service.
To our knowledge, the extant evidence on the effects of SBCS on small business credit is limited to two studies. One study estimated that the use of SBCS increased the portfolio share of small business loans under $100K for a sample of large 2. Similar statistical techniques, such as discriminant analysis, are also used in lending to larger businesses but these are typically not focused on the personal credit history of the owners (Saunders 2000) .
3. See Eisenbeis (1996) and Mester (1997) for detailed background information about the introduction of SBCS. 4. This model, which was constructed in cooperation with the Robert Morris Associates, was further refined in 1996 using data from 25 banks.
5. Under Basle II as it is proposed for U.S. institutions, a bifurcated capital regulation system would be created. Large U.S. banking organizations that adopt the Advanced IRB approach (A-IRB) would face different capital ratios for small business loans and other financial instruments, while other institutions would remain guided by the Basle I risk weights. Small business loans made by A-IRB banks may receive favorable treatment if these loans are classified as retail exposures. This requires that the small business loans be small (under V1 million) and be managed as retail exposures or be guaranteed by an individual. However, some of the small business loans that are classified as corporate exposures by A-IRB banks may also receive a different favorable treatment in some circumstances under a "carve-out" for firms with under V50 million in sales. See Basle Committee on Bank Supervision (2002) for details. commercial banking organizations in 1997 (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley 2001) . The other study found that the use of SBCS by large banks in 1997 increased small business loans under $100K in low-and moderate-income census tracts by about as much as in higher-income areas (Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2005) . 6 While we employ the same SBCS survey data used in these two studies, we make several significant extensions and contributions. First, we examine the effects of SBCS on the price and risk of small business credits as well as the quantity of this credit, providing a more complete picture of how small business applicants fare from the adoption of SBCS. Second, we test for bank-specific learning curves, or how the effects of SBCS vary with the length of time since an individual bank adopted SBCS. Third, we conduct our analysis over a three-year period and test for an industry learning curve, rather than focusing exclusively on 1997. Fourth, we examine how the effects of SBCS differ with how the technology is implemented ("rules" versus "discretion"). Finally, we investigate how the effects of SBCS differ by the size of the credits-under $100K versus $100K-$250K.
Recent research is consistent with a view of SBCS as one of several recent innovations for delivering financial services driven by technological improvements. Two studies found that SBCS is more likely to be adopted, or adopted earlier, by larger banking organizations with more branches, but fewer separately chartered banks (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001, Akhavein, Frame, and White, 2004) . Other recent research is consistent with a view of SBCS as part of an on-going movement to use more quantitative methods in bank small business lending. Some studies found that banks increased the distances at which they lent to small businesses and the use of impersonal methods of contact prior to the widespread implementation of SBCS in the mid-1990s (e.g., Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken, 1997, Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . Others found that banks increased their small business lending outside their own local market in recent years after SBCS became widespread (Hannan 2003) . One study also found that banking organizations have been increasing their control over distant affiliates over time, consistent with the use of more quantitative methods such as SBCS, which may require less monitoring of loan officers (Berger and DeYoung 2002) . Finally, another study suggested that the latter trend may be directly linked to SBCS-as its use was found to increase the probability that a large bank will make loans in a given census tract (Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2004) .
The introduction of SBCS and its economic effects are also related to the issue of technological change and productivity growth in the banking industry. Studies of U.S. bank productivity growth during the 1990s often found either productivity declines or only very slight improvements using cost productivity or linear programming methods (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 1999, Stiroh, 2000, Berger and Mester, 6 . Other types of credit scoring have also been found to yield significant effects. One study found that credit scores based solely on business information (primarily trade credit data) generated by Dun and Bradstreet added significant explanatory power in predicting firm failure (Kallberg and Udell 2003) . Research on consumer credit scoring also generally found that the scores are the best predictors of repayment, with only minor improvements from additional data such as household income and location (e.g., Avery et al. 2000) . 2003 ). However, the latter study also found profit productivity to be increasing even while cost productivity declined, especially for large banks. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that technological progress allowed banks to offer more or better services that may have raised costs, but that customers were willing to pay more for these services, raising revenues by more than the cost increases. A number of technological changes are likely responsible for this finding, possibly including SBCS if it resulted in greater lending to high-cost borrowers that were charged high prices for credit that more than covered their high costs. As shown below, our empirical results are consistent with this possibility.
Finally, SBCS is intertwined with the issue of the effect of banking industry consolidation on credit availability. A number of studies found that large banks tend to devote lower proportions of their assets to small business lending than smaller institutions and that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving large banking organizations generally reduce small business lending substantially (e.g., Berger et al. 1998) . The adoption of SBCS may offset some or all of this reduction in credit by large consolidated banks. The consolidating institutions or other institutions may use the SBCS technology to serve some of the firms that might otherwise be dropped, or use this technology to extend credit to other firms that might otherwise not receive bank funding.
DATA SOURCES
The data are drawn from several sources. The first is a January 1998 telephone survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, which queried the lead (largest) banks of 190 of the 200 largest U.S. banking organizations on whether and how they used SBCS.
7 Ninety-nine institutions responded and indicated whether their bank had adopted SBCS and, if so, the date of the adoption. Data were also collected from these banks about the sizes of credits that were scored, whether they purchased scores, and whether the scores were used in automated approval/ rejection or pricing decisions.
We also draw data from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank Lending (STBL). The STBL covers approximately 300 U.S. banks per quarter (although the respondent set is not constant over time), and obtains details on the contract terms and risk ratings of all new domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans issued by these banks during one or more days of the first week of the second month of the quarter. The survey oversamples the largest banks, which is helpful for matching with the credit scoring survey. For the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, we are able to match the contract terms of 49, 47, and 56 banks, respectively, from the STBL that also responded to the SBCS survey. Our analysis of loan risk is restricted to 1997 because the risk ratings were first collected in the second quarter of 1997. 8 Finally, we match these SBCS and loan contract data with information on the bank and other banks in its local markets from standard regulatory reports. The June Call Reports provide data on small business loans outstanding as of June 30 of that year by each bank. The data include the outstanding values of C&I loans to firms with total credit of less than $100K and to firms with credit of $100K-$250K, as well as to larger credits for which SBCS is generally not relevant. The dollar values for the size categories are in nominal terms and include the total amount of the commitment (if any). As is standard procedure in banking research, we treat these credits as small business loans, although in some cases these may be small credits to large businesses. The FDIC's Summary of Deposits data set gives the location of every branch of every bank and the total deposits in each branch. By combining Call Report and Summary of Deposits data, we are able to compute weightedaverage values for local market deposit concentration and the conditions of other banks in the local markets in which each sample bank competes.
Our sample is not fully representative of the banking industry or of all banks that have adopted SBCS. The credit scoring and STBL surveys are both more representative of the largest banks and there may be further non-response bias as well. Nonetheless, the data do represent a significant fraction of the small business lending of the banking industry. As of June 30, 1997, the 56 banks that responded to both the SBCS and STBL surveys held 24.5% of all C&I loans less than $100K and 24.3% of all C&I loans in the $100K-$250K range within the banking industry. We also acknowledge that our sample period coincides with relative prosperity, and so may not fully represent the differences between banks that have and have not adopted SBCS over the entire business cycle.
VARIABLES, SAMPLE STATISTICS, AND EMPIRICAL MODELS
We specify three sets of cross-sectional regressions to examine the effects of credit scoring on small business loan quantities, prices, and credit risks. Our main focus is on small business credits under $100K using cross-section data for 1997-the most recent year of the data set that reflects the most industry experience with SBCS. Table 1 describes the variables used in the quantity, price, and risk regressions and provides their means and standard deviations over the 1995-97 period for both small business credits under $100K and those in the $100K-$250K interval. For 8. We are also missing risk ratings from some banks that did not maintain internal ratings or failed to convert their internal ratings into the STBL risk-rating format. 23,796,332 (44,682,987) 24,133,708 (44,825,833) 22,348,479 (35,686,409) 23,478,629 (36,833,422) included in simplicity, all variables that refer to the smaller credits have a "1" suffix, and those that refer to the larger credits have a "2" suffix. While many of the variables used in the different regressions are conceptually identical, they may have substantially different sample statistics because the quantity regressions weight each bank equally, whereas the price and risk regressions weight each loan equally. The dependent variable for the loan quantity regressions is SBL-RATIO, the share of gross total assets (GTA) devoted to small business lending by each bank for each loan size category. The sample banks averaged a ratio of 1.38% for credits under $100K and 0.88% for credits of $100K-$250K.
Variables and Sample Statistics
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The dependent variable for the price regressions is PREM, the loan rate premium, or the difference between the loan interest rate and the rate on a Treasury security of comparable duration.
10 Defining the price of the loan as a spread (rather than in levels) allows us to directly account for prevailing credit market conditions. The average loan premium for the credits under $100K is 4.50%, or 450 basis points, while the average PREM for the credits of $100K-$250K is 3.98%.
The dependent variable for the risk regressions is RISK-RATING, which takes the value 1 if the loan is rated "minimal" risk, 2 if the loan is rated "low" risk, 3 if the loan is rated "moderate" risk, 4 if the loan is rated "acceptable" risk, and 5 if the loan is special mention or a classified asset (usually part of a workout arrangement). The STBL instructions relate the rating of 1 with AA rated corporate bonds and the rating of 2 with BBB corporate bonds, but it is difficult to provide a bond equivalent for ratings lower than 2. There is a strong bivariate association between risk and loan price, as expected. For credits under $100K, the average PREM for the five risk values are 0.0271, 0.0357, 0.0425, 0.0434, and 0.0474, respectively.
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The means and standard deviations for the exogenous variables in the risk regressions differ somewhat from the sample statistics shown in Table 1 for the price regressions because of the smaller sample size (RISK-RATING was first reported in 1997:Q2).
Our key exogenous variables are those indicating the use of SBCS. The first SBCS variable is ADOPTED-SBCS, a dummy variable indicating whether a bank had adopted SBCS. SBCS had been adopted for 46.05% and 32.45% of the bank-year observations for the credits under $100K and $100K-$250K, respectively. The corresponding figures are higher for individual loans employed in the price regressions, 63.17% and 46.87%, respectively, likely because the banks that have adopted SBCS tend to be larger and have more loans represented in the data set.
To account for bank-specific learning curves for the technology, we include TIME-SINCE, the number of years since the bank adopted SBCS. As the banks gain 9. The overall range of SBL-RATIO is from 0.07% to 11.15% (median ϭ 1.06%) for credits under $100K, and from 0.01% to 3.31% (median ϭ 0.74%) for credits of $100K-$250K. There is one observation less for the larger credits-151 versus 152-because one bank in one year reported no loans of $100K-$250K.
10. We omit all observations for which PREM is less than Ϫ0.01 or greater than 0.15 to eliminate observations that may be grossly mismeasured.
11. Banks may differ in their interpretation of the STBL risk ratings or in their translation of internal ratings into STBL ratings. For example, internal ratings could measure either default probabilities or the expected costs of future losses (Brady, English, and Nelson 1998). experience with SBCS, they may continue to change their lending behavior as they determine which applicants are best suited to SBCS, find techniques to reduce the costs of using SBCS, and, for banks that use proprietary models, update the variables and specifications in their SBCS models. The sample statistics for TIME-SINCE in Table 1 incorporate zeros for banks that have not adopted SBCS, so these figures must be interpreted with care. For example, the 0.7100 in the first column implies that over 1995-97, of the 46.05% of bank-years in which SBCS had been adopted for credits under $100K, the technology had been employed for 1.542 years on average (0.7100/0.4605).
We use three dummy variables to capture the differences between "rules" banks and "discretion" banks. BOUGHT indicates whether the bank purchased credit scores from a vendor, SET-TERMS denotes whether the bank used SBCS to set loan terms, and AUTO-APPROVE indicates whether the bank used SBCS to automatically approval or reject loan applicants.
12 A bank that purchases its scores and uses these scores to set terms and automatically approve/reject is considered a "rules" bank because it essentially abdicates its choice of credit model inputs and weights, and leaves relatively little discretion available for its loan officers. In contrast, a bank that employs its own credit scoring model, and uses other factors to set terms and approve/reject applicants is considered a "discretion" bank because it uses its own judgment to choose model inputs and weights, and leaves more discretion for its loan officers to set terms and approve/reject potential credits. Our use of "rules" versus "discretion" is a shorthand way of describing the differences among banks, and it is not meant to imply that any banks use only rules or only discretion for every small business loan. In practice, all "rules" banks allow for some judgmental overrides, and all "discretion" banks use some rules for automatic rejections.
The tests of the differences between "rules" banks and "discretion" banks may help distinguish between the effects of SBCS when it is used more as a substitute for other lending technologies (e.g., financial statement lending, asset-based lending, relationship lending) versus being used more as a complement to these other technologies. "Rules" banks may be thought of as those that primarily substitute SBCS for other lending technologies. A bank that purchases a score and uses it for automated decisions is essentially using only SBCS and no other technology for the affected loan applicants. It seems likely that "rules" banks may use SBCS to reduce lending costs, given that it is fairly inexpensive to purchase a score and put very little additional effort into underwriting the loan. In contrast, "discretion" banks may be thought of as using SBCS as a complement to other lending technologies, i.e., adding the scores to information gathered using other lending technologies to create the model and make the credit decisions. For "discretion" banks, it seems likely that lending costs may increase because the bank is bearing the expense of generating its own credit 12. The specific questions included in the survey in generating these variables (slightly paraphrased here) were: (1) What is your source of small business credit scores? (developed own scoring model versus purchased scores or model); (2) Do you use small business credit scores to set loan terms? (Yes or No); and (3) Do you use small business credit scores to set automatically approve or reject applications? (Yes or No) . See Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) for additional details of the survey.
scores plus continuing to use other lending technologies in the credit decisions. These banks may be more likely to use the additional information from SBCS to improve accuracy in evaluating the creditworthiness of the applicants.
Again, the sample statistics shown in Table 1 must be interpreted with care because they incorporate zeros for banks that have not adopted SBCS. The means in the first column of 0.3816, 0.1579, and 0.2434 imply that 82.87%, 34.29%, and 52.86% of the banks that adopted SBCS for credits under $100K had bought the scores, used them to set terms, and used them for automatic approvals/denials, respectively (0.3816/0.4605, 0.1579/0.4605, and 0.2434/0.4605). It is notable that for credits of $100K-$250K, approval/denial decisions are much less often automated.
We also control for certain bank and local market variables. To account for bank size, we include the natural logarithm of GTA in real, 1994 dollars (LN(GTA)) and a dummy variable indicating whether the bank had GTA exceeding $10 billion (GTA Ͼ 10B). 13 As discussed above, prior research suggests that larger banks tend to devote relatively low proportions of their assets to small business lending, so it is important to control for the independent effects of bank size. As shown, banks in the sample average about $24 billion in GTA and about half had GTA over $10 billion. We include three variables about the bank's financial condition: (1) the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL); (2) the ratio of net income to equity (ROE); and (3) the ratio of equity to gross total assets (EQRAT). The bank's financial condition may affect its ability to lend both because of market and regulatory pressures, i.e., banks with relatively high nonperforming loans, low income, and/ or low equity may be discouraged from expanding their loan portfolios.
The local market variables measure market deposit concentration (M-HERF), nonperforming loans (M-NPL), profitability (M-ROE), and equity (M-EQRAT). Market concentration is traditionally associated with higher prices and restriction of output, although recent theories suggest that concentration may encourage banks to invest in lending relationships with small businesses because the borrowers are less likely to find alternative future sources of credit (Petersen and Rajan 1995) . The financial conditions of other banks in the local market help control for both the risks of lending in the market and the ability of other banks to supply credit.
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The bank and local market data are constructed from the previous December's Call Reports to help mitigate potential endogeneity problems, and the market data are weighted averages across all the markets in which the bank has deposits, based on the previous June's Summary of Deposits data. 13. The overall range of GTA is from about $1.2 billion to $265 billion, with a median of $9.8 billion. 14. We also try including weighted-average market personal income growth, and the main findings are robust to this change in specification.
15. Thus, the market variables are weighted averages across all markets-Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or non-MSA counties-in which the bank has offices. To illustrate, consider M-ROE for 1995. We measure the 1995 M-ROE using year-end 1994 profitability information from all banks in each local market in which a sample bank operates. We then weight each market average with total deposit information on each local market as reported in June 1994 for each bank in our sample.
We also control for a number of loan contract terms, including whether collateral is pledged (COLLATERAL), whether the loan is drawn under a commitment (COM-MITMENT), the repayment duration of the loan (DURATION), whether the rate is floating (FLOATING RATE), and the total credit size, including the amount of any commitment (TOTAL SIZE). These contract terms help control for differences in credit risk, term premiums, and borrower heterogeneity. For the quantity regressions, we use the proportions of the bank's small business credits reported on the STBL over the year with the contract terms. As shown in Table 1 , we designate these proportions with the prefix "P." For the price and risk regressions, we include the terms associated with each individual loan. We recognize that to some extent, the bank and firm may trade off between the price and the other contract terms, which introduces a potential endogeneity problem. As a consequence, we run all regressions both with and without contract terms to evaluate the robustness of our results.
The price and risk regressions also include seasonal dummy variables that indicate the quarter in which the loan was made (Q1-Q4). The first quarter dummy Q1 is omitted from the price regressions as the base case, whereas both Q1 and Q2 are omitted from the risk regressions because the risk ratings were first collected in 1997:Q2. Table 2 shows the means of some selected variables for banks that did and did not use SBCS for credits under $100K for 1997, the final year of the data set and the focus of most of our empirical analysis below. The means are by bank for bank NOTES: Means for selected variables in 1997, separately for banks that have adopted SBCS technology for credits under $100K and banks that have not done so. GTA is measured in $ billions in real 1994 terms for this table. Number of bank observations for GTA, GTA Ͼ 10B, and SBL-RATIO 1 is 56. The number of loan observations for PREM 1 is 16,040. RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, RISK4, and RISK5 are dummy variables that equal one when RISK-RATING 1 equals, one, two, three, four, and five, respectively. The number of loan observations for RISK1, RISK2, RISK3, RISK4, and RISK5 is 7515. This table also shows the differences for ADOPTED-SBCS 1 ϭ 1 versus ADOPTED-SBCS 1 ϭ 0 and the corresponding t-statistics for these differences. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. size and small business lending ratio, but are by loan for the price and risk variables, which are available for individual loans. We also show the differences between the two groups and t-statistics for these differences. The data suggest that the banks that adopted SBCS tend to (1) be much larger institutions, (2) have slightly lower small business loan ratios (although the difference is not statistically significant), and (3) have higher loan interest rates and risks than banks that did not adopt the technology. In our multivariate analysis below, we control for bank size and other factors, and find that the adoption of SBCS is associated with higher small business lending ratios. Given the common research finding that the largest banks tend to have much lower values of SBL-RATIO than other banks, the evidence is consistent with the possibility that the SBCS technology helps the largest banks raise their small business lending ratios towards those of other banks.
Regression Specifications
We specify three regressions for the quantity of small business credits under $100K:
Bank and Market Variables,
SBL-RATIO1 ϭ g (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, Bank and Market Variables, P-Loan Contract Terms) ,
SBL-RATIO1 ϭ h (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, BOUGHT1, SET-TERMS1, AUTO-APPROVE1, Bank and Market Variables,
where Bank and Market Variables, and P-Loan Contract Terms represent all the bank and market variables and average contract terms shown for the quantity regressions in Table 1 .
Equations (1)- (3) are estimated both with and without the P-Loan Contract Terms by OLS. In Equation (1), we use ADOPTED-SBCS as a single indicator of SBCS to test for an overall impact of adoption. Comparing results across individual years allows us to test for an industry learning curve. Equation (2) adds the TIME-SINCE 1 variable to test for any bank-specific learning curves, or how the effects of SBCS change as time passes after its adoption. Equation (3) further allows SBCS to have different effects on lending quantities for "rules" banks versus "discretion" banks by including BOUGHT 1, SET-TERMS 1, and AUTO-APPROVE 1. For credits of $100K-$250K, we repeat the experiment substituting in the "2" data for these larger credits. However, we only estimate a version of Equation (1), and do not estimate versions of Equations (2) and (3) because of the limited variation in the survey responses for credits of this size.
Turning to prices, the regressions for the premiums on small business credits under $100K are:
PREM1 ϭ f (ADOPTED-SBCS1, Bank and Market Variables, Loan Contract Terms, Seasonal dummies) ,
PREM1 ϭ g (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, Bank and Market Variables, Loan Contract Terms, Seasonal dummies) ,
PREM1 ϭ h (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, BOUGHT1, SET-TERMS1, AUTO-APPROVE1, Bank and Market Variables, Loan Contract Terms, Seasonal dummies) ,
where Bank and Market Variables, Loan Contract Terms, and Seasonal dummies represent all corresponding variables shown for the price regressions in Table 1 .
Equations (4)- (6) are estimated both with and without the Loan Contract Terms by OLS, using the White correction to adjust the t-statistics for heteroskedasticity.
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Similar to the quantity regressions, we repeat the experiment for credits in the $100K-$250K interval, but only estimate a version of Equation (4) because of limited variation in the data.
The three regressions for the risk ratings of small business credits under $100K are given by:
RISK-RATING1 ϭ g (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, Bank Variables, Loan Contract Terms, Seasonal dummies) ,
RISK-RATING1 ϭ h (ADOPTED-SBCS1, TIME-SINCE1, BOUGHT1, SET-TERMS1, AUTO-APPROVE1, Bank Variables, Loan Contract Terms, Seasonal dummies) ,
Equations (7)- (9) are estimated both with and without the Loan Contract Terms by ordered logit. We exclude market variables because the presence of both bank and market variables creates large, conflicting coefficients among these variables. Fortunately, the estimated coefficients of the key exogenous variables, the SBCS variables, are materially unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the market variables. 17 We again repeat the experiment for credits in the $100K-$250K interval, but only estimate a version of Equation (7) because of limited data variation.
All reported regressions exclude observations from banks that have adopted SBCS within the prior 12 months of the observed loan quantity, price, or risk rating used as the dependent variable.
18 This reduces the possibility of three potential problems. First, although the SBCS survey indicates the month that each bank adopted the technology, the timeframe for full SBCS implementation is uncertain and may vary across banks. By eliminating banks that recently began using SBCS, we can more confidently compare banks that had fully implemented SBCS technology to those banks that had not adopted SBCS. Second, the dependent variables in the quantity regressions may in some cases mix data on loans that were issued before and after SBCS was adopted, since SBL-RATIO 1,2 are stock measures that include both recently issued credits plus some longer-term credits issued in earlier periods. As shown in Table 1 , the average repayment duration of the small business loans (P-DURATION 1,2) is less than one year, so we obtain a relatively clean comparison by restricting ourselves to comparing banks that have been using SBCS for at least one year with banks that have never adopted SBCS. Third, as discussed further below, this restriction addresses the potential "joint determination" problem in which the decision to adopt SBCS may be based on current conditions that also influence loan quantities, prices, and risks. This potential problem is mitigated by using data that are at least one year after SBCS adoption, when conditions have changed to some degree. A cost of this restriction is the loss of degrees of freedom in estimation-e.g., the number of available observations for our SBL-RATIO regressions for 1997 is reduced from 56 to 41.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section discusses the empirical effects of SBCS on the quantity, price, and risk of small business credits. First, we test the overall effects for small business credits under $100K in 1997 (Table 3) . Second, we test for the presence and slope 17. Multicollinearity among control variables in logit regressions sometimes creates unrealistically large and conflicting coefficients among these variables because of the nonlinear nature of the logit procedure. For example, if very large banks tend to be in very unconcentrated metropolitan markets, then the nonlinear logit procedure may give very large and conflicting measured effects of the bank GTA Ͼ 10B and M-HERF variables that mostly cancel each other out. In our ordered logit regressions, the five bank control variables and four market control variables have large and conflicting coefficients when all are included, but they do not materially affect the estimated coefficients of the key exogenous variables. This does not occur in the SBL-RATIO and PREM regressions, which are run using linear methods.
18. For the quantity regressions, we exclude banks that adopted SBCS less than 12 months before the June Call Report. For the price and risk regressions, we exclude banks that adopted SBCS less than 12 months before the date the loan was made.
of bank-specific learning curves (Table 4) . Third, we test for the presence and slope of industry learning curves over the 1995-97 interval (Tables 5 and 6 ). Fourth, we test for differences between "rules" banks and "discretion" banks (Table 7) . Fifth, we test the overall effect of SBCS for credits of $100K-$250K in 1997 (Table 8) . Table 3 presents the overall effects of SBCS on the quantity, price, and risk of small business credits under $100K for 1997. Each regression is run twice: including and excluding the potentially endogenous loan contract terms. We estimated our empirical models using OLS for the quantity and price regressions (Panels 1 and 2) and ordered logit for the risk regressions (Panel 3).
The Overall Effect of SBCS on Credits Under $100K
The data suggest that SBCS is associated with higher small business loan ratios (Panel 1). The coefficient on ADOPTED-SBCS 1 (0.0051) implies a 37% higher small business loan ratio at the sample mean (0.0051/0.0138). This positive effect is consistent with prior research (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001, Frame, Padhi, and Woosley, 2004) . Although the result is statistically significant at only the 10% level, the relationship is highly significant for some types of banks, as shown below. The positive relationship between SBCS and small business loan ratios is consistent with a net increase in small business lending after adopting SBCS, although we also discuss alternative potential explanations of this finding in Section 5 below.
We further find that SBCS is associated with higher loan prices (Panel 2). The coefficient on ADOPTED-SBCS 1 (0.0032) implies a 32 basis point difference in loan premiums.
We also find that SBCS is positively associated with loan risk (Panel 3). 19 To evaluate the magnitude of the loan risk results, we compare the predicted effects on the proportions of borrowers with the five risk ratings by setting ADOPTED-SBCS 1 at values of one versus zero, with all other regressors at the sample median. That is, we compare the predicted risk rating distribution for an SBCS bank versus a non-scoring bank at the median for the control variables. When ADOPTED-SBCS 1 equals zero (a non-SBCS bank), the predicted percentages for minimal risk, low risk, moderate risk, acceptable risk, and special mention/classified asset are 1.20%, 4.60%, 51.85%, 37.51%, and 4.76%, respectively, using the specification with the contract terms specified in the equation. When ADOPTED-SBCS 1 equals one (an SBCS bank), the predicted percentages are 0.75%, 2.76%, 40.84%, 47.76%, and 7.80%, respectively. Thus, a loan by a scoring bank is more likely to be evaluated as being in the two highest risk categories, and total amount of the shift into these two categories is 13.29 percentage points. 20 The higher average prices and greater 19. Our results are robust to the exclusion of 55 loans made by three banks that reported no variation in their risk ratings.
20. We also run the ordered logit for RISK-RATING 1 weighted by the total credit size of the loan (TOTAL SIZE 1), and the findings are quite similar (not shown in the table). To illustrate, the coefficient on ADOPTED-SBCS 1 using the contract-terms specification becomes slightly larger, 0.6689, and remains significant at the 1% level. In terms of magnitudes, the predicted percentages for RISK 1,...,RISK 5 are 1.40%, 6.52%, 53.59%, 34.63%, and 3.87%, respectively for ADOPTED-SBCS 1 ϭ 0 and 0.72%, 3.50%, 40.79%, 47.71%, and 7.28%, respectively for ADOPTED-SBCS 1 ϭ 1. Thus, the total shift into two highest risk categories is 16.49 percentage points, slightly higher than for the unweighted model. NOTES: Regressions for SBL-RATIO 1, the ratio of small business loans under $100K to GTA, PREM, the premium over the Treasury rate of comparable repayment duration for loans under $100K, and RISK-RATING 1, which equals one if the loan has "minimal" risk, two if the loan has "low" risk, three if the loan has "moderate" risk, four if the loan has "acceptable" risk, and five if the loan is a special mention or classified asset. Data are taken for 1997. Number of observations varies across regressions. Where SBL-RATIO 1 is the dependent variable, the contract terms are bank averages. Where PREM 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q2, Q3, and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made, and t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White correction. Where RISK-RATING 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made. The adjusted R-squared for the logit regressions measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model's non-intercept independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. NOTES: Regressions for SBL-RATIO 1, the ratio of small business loans under $100K to GTA, PREM, the premium over the Treasury rate of comparable repayment duration for loans under $100K, and RISK-RATING 1, which equals one if the loan has "minimal" risk, two if the loan has "low" risk, three if the loan has "moderate" risk, four if the loan has "acceptable" risk, and five if the loan is a special mention or classified asset. Data are taken for 1997. Number of observations varies across regressions. Numbers in italics represent imputed cumulative effects and their t-statistics. Where SBL-RATIO 1 is the dependent variable, the contract terms are bank averages. Where PREM 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q2, Q3, and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made, and t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White correction. Where RISK-RATING 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made. The adjusted R-squared for the logit regressions measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model's non-intercept independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. Table 3 . Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. Table 3 . Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. NOTES: Regressions for SBL-RATIO 1, the ratio of small business loans under $100K to GTA, PREM, the premium over the Treasury rate of comparable repayment duration for loans under $100K, and RISK-RATING 1, which equals one if the loan has "minimal" risk, two if the loan has "low" risk, three if the loan has "moderate" risk, four if the loan has "acceptable" risk, and five if the loan is a special mention or classified asset. Data are taken for 1997. Number of observations varies across regressions. Numbers in italics represent imputed cumulative effects and their t-statistics. Where indicated, Loan Contract Terms are included in the regressions but are not shown to conserve space. Where SBL-RATIO 1 is the dependent variable, the contract terms are bank averages. Where PREM 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q2, Q3, and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made, and t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White correction. Where RISK-RATING 1 is the dependent variable, the regression also includes Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made. The adjusted R-squared for the logit regressions measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model's non-intercept independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. NOTES: Regressions for SBL-RATIO 2, the ratio of small business loans between $100K and $250K to GTA, PREM 2, the premium over the Treasury rate of comparable repayment duration for loans between $100K and $250K, and RISK-RATING 2, which equals one if the loan has "minimal" risk, two if the loan has "low" risk, three if the loan has "moderate" risk, four if the loan has "acceptable" risk, and five if the loan is a special mention or classified asset. Data are taken for 1997. Number of observations varies across regressions. Where SBL-RATIO 1 is the dependent variable, the contract terms are bank averages. Where PREM 2 is the dependent variable, the regression includes Q2, Q3, and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made, and t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White correction. Where RISK-RATING 2 is the dependent variable, the regression includes Q3 and Q4, which indicate the quarter in which the loan was made. The adjusted R-squared for the logit regressions measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model's non-intercept independent variables. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
average risk levels suggest that on average, scored credits are riskier for one or more reasons discussed below. The loan prices may also embody changes in lending costs that may be passed through to borrowers. We discuss more alternative possibilities in Section 5. Turning to control variable results in Table 3 , in Panel 1, increased bank sizemeasured by LN(GTA) and GTA Ͼ 10B-is negatively related to the bank's portfolio share of small business loans, consistent with the extant literature. Results for bank health (NPL, ROE, EQRAT) and the health of banks in the market (M-NPL, M-ROE, M-EQRAT) are mixed, while market concentration (M-HERF) is positively related to the bank's portfolio share of small business loans. The general lack of statistical significance among the control variables in the quantity regressions is not surprising given the limited degrees of freedom.
In Panel 2, bank size is positively associated with higher loan prices. Results for bank health and market health are again mixed, while market concentration is associated with higher average prices, consistent with market power. The five loan contract terms are generally statistically significant. Loan commitments are positively related to prices, while collateral, duration, floating rates, and loan size are negatively related to prices. In some cases (e.g., collateral), the sign differs from some of the empirical literature, but the signs of these contract terms are difficult to predict because they mesh the direct effects of the contract terms with what they may signal about the borrowers. In Panel 3, bank size and bank health have mixed associations with loan risk.
Bank-Specific Learning Curves for Credits under $100K
In Table 4 , we test for the presence and slope of bank-specific SBCS learning curves for the quantity, price, and risk of small business credits under $100K in 1997 by adding TIME-SINCE 1 to our empirical models. As noted above, banks may continue to change their lending behavior as they gain experience with SBCS and learn which applicants are best suited to SBCS, find ways to reduce costs, improve prediction of loan default, and so forth. We also impute the cumulative effects of SBCS after n years, n ϭ 1,2,3, by adding the ADOPTED-SBCS 1 coefficient and n times the TIME-SINCE 1 coefficient. 21 For example, as Panel 1 shows, the cumulative effect of SBCS on SBL-RATIO 1 after three years is 0.0016 ϩ (3 × 0.00174) ϭ 0.0068, which implies a 49% higher small business lending ratio at the sample mean (0.0068/0.0138).
In Panel 1, both ADOPTED-SBCS 1 and TIME-SINCE 1 are associated with higher small business loan ratios, although neither is statistically significant. Nonetheless, the imputed cumulative effects after both two and three years (0.0051 and 0.0068) are statistically different from zero and consistent with the overall result 21. We impute the estimated effects for up to three years to avoid extrapolating beyond the bounds of the data, although learning may continue for longer than this. The 41 observations in the SBL-RATIO regressions include 18 banks that did not score and 23 that had scored longer than one year. Of these 23 banks, nine used SBCS longer than two years, and six used it longer than three years.
shown above. The positive TIME-SINCE 1 coefficient suggests an upward sloping bank-specific learning curve for small business loan quantities.
Turning to the bank-specific learning curve for loan premiums (Panel 2), both ADOPTED-SBCS 1 and TIME-SINCE 1 are positively associated with PREM 1. In the main specification, the TIME-SINCE 1 coefficient is statistically insignificant and small (three basis points), suggesting a relatively flat learning curve for premiums. By contrast, in the specification that excludes contract terms, the TIME-SINCE 1 coefficient is statistically significant and larger (12 basis points), suggesting a steeper bank-specific learning curve for loan premiums. Despite this disparity, the cumulative effect in both cases after three years (34 and 44 basis points) is similar in magnitude to the overall impact discussed in Table 3 .
Looking next at the slope of the bank-specific learning curve for loan risk (Panel 3), we find that more experience with SBCS is associated with greater loan risk. The positive and statistically significant TIME-SINCE 1 coefficient implies an upward sloping bank-specific learning curve for loan risk. To evaluate the magnitude of the effects, we compare the predicted effects on the proportions of borrowers with the five risk ratings after three years of scoring versus not scoring at the median for the control variables. Using the contract-terms specification, a non-SBCS bank has predicted percentages for minimal risk, low risk, moderate risk, acceptable risk, and special mention/classified asset of 1.20%, 4.33%, 50.76%, 38.77%, and 4.94%, respectively. For a bank with three years of experience with SBCS, the predicted percentages are 0.58%, 2.17%, 35.60%, 51.93%, and 9.71%, respectively. As above, a loan by a scoring bank is more likely to be evaluated as being in the two highest risk categories, and the predicted shift into these categories is 17.93 percentage points.
Industry Learning Curves for Credits under $100K
In addition to the bank-specific learning curves, there may be industry learning curves in which banks learn collectively from the industry's experience. SBCS was a relatively new technology during the time period under study, so the best method for using it may not have been generally known until a significant number of banks had experience from which others could learn. Perhaps more important for collective learning, more than 80% of the banks that adopted SBCS for credits under $100K bought the scores, mostly from a common vendor, Fair, Isaac and Company. Over time, the vendors presumably incorporated more information into the models and into the technical advice given to the users, so that much of the learning may have been shared by most of the industry.
We test for industry learning curves for the quantity and price of small business credits under $100K. Because the STBL began collecting risk ratings in 1997, we are unable to extend the analysis to loan risk. We also limit attention to the overall impacts and exclude TIME-SINCE 1 and the cumulative effects after one, two, and three years because too few banks had significant experience before 1997. Table 5 shows the overall impact of SBCS on loan quantities in 1995-1997, and Table 6 gives the overall effect on loan prices for these years. The 1997 results replicate the findings from Table 3 to facilitate the comparisons. With regard to loan quantities, SBCS is not statistically related to differences in small business lending ratios in 1995 or 1996, but is associated with higher ratios in 1997. With regard to loan prices, the industry learning curve appears to be fairly steep-SBCS is associated with a Ϫ25 basis point difference in average loan premiums in 1995, an 8 basis point difference in 1996, and a 32 basis point difference in 1997. These findings are consistent with upward sloping industry SBCS learning curves for both quantities and prices in the sense that the quantity and price effects increase over time. 
"Rules" Banks versus "Discretion" Banks for Credits under $100K
To allow for differences in banks' SBCS implementation strategies, we delineate those banks that purchased their SBCS model (BOUGHT 1), used SBCS to set credit terms (SET-TERMS 1), and used SBCS to automate approval/rejection decisions (AUTO-APPROVE 1). We impute the cumulative effects of SBCS after n years, n ϭ 1,2,3, for both "rules" banks and "discretion" banks. We run the regressions for all banks and then impute separate effects for banks with "1s" for BOUGHT 1, SET-TERMS 1, and AUTO-APPROVE 1 ("rules" banks) and banks with "0s" for these three variables ("discretion" banks). Table 7 shows that the imputed cumulative effect of SBCS on small business loan ratios is positive and statistically significant for "rules" banks (Panel 1). After three years of experience with SBCS, the imputed cumulative effect of 0.0147 suggests that a "rules" bank will increase its small business loan ratio by 106% at the sample mean (0.0147/0.0138). The imputed cumulative effect of SBCS for "discretion" banks is not statistically significantly different from zero. Of the three individual variables, only SET-TERMS 1 is statistically significant in the equation including contract terms, suggesting that using the technology to set loan contract terms may be associated with increased lending.
The imputed cumulative effects of SBCS on loan premiums are positive and statistically significant for both "rules" banks and "discretion" banks (Panel 2). However, the magnitude of the effect is much greater for "discretion" banks. After three years of experience with SBCS, the imputed cumulative effect of 0.0037 suggests that a "rules" bank will increase its average premium by 37 basis points, or 8% at the sample mean (0.0037/0.045). In contrast, the imputed cumulative effect of 0.0199 for "discretion" banks implies an increase in average spreads by nearly 200 basis points, or 44% (0.0199/0.045). The coefficients of the individual variables suggest that buying scores and using them for automatic approval results in lower loan prices.
The imputed cumulative effects suggest that SBCS is associated with greater loan risk for "rules" banks, but less loan risk for "discretion" banks (Panel 3). Using the contract-terms specification, a non-SBCS bank has predicted percentages for the safest 22. The findings of very different coefficients for the different time periods also support our decision to analyze the years separately, rather than specify a pooled time series-cross-section model. to riskiest ratings of 1.29%, 4.89%, 60.43%, 31.12%, and 2.28%. For a "rules" bank with three years of SBCS experience, the predicted percentages are 0.12%, 0.50%, 15.33%, 64.38%, and 19.67%, a shift into the two riskiest categories of 50.65 percentage points. For a "discretion" bank after three years, the predicted percentages are 3.86%, 13.01%, 69.14%, 13.23%, and 0.75%, a shift away from the two riskiest categories of 19.42 percentage points. The findings for the individual variables suggest that using SBCS to set terms and automatically approve loans are associated with higher loan risk.
Thus, the data suggest that clear differences in the outcomes depending upon how the SBCS technology is implemented. As previously argued, "rules" banks may be more likely to use SBCS as a substitute for existing lending technologies to reduce lending costs, and "discretion" banks may be more likely to use SBCS as a complement to existing lending technologies to improve accuracy in evaluating creditworthiness. The "rules" banks results-higher loan quantities, prices, and risksare consistent with reduced lending costs from substitution allowing these banks to expand their net lending, albeit with higher average risks. The "discretion" banks results-little change in quantities, higher prices, and lower risks-are consistent with a passing through of some higher lending costs from using more than one lending technology, but with reductions in average loan risk due to improved accuracy.
Credits of $100K-$250K
We also test the effects of SBCS on the quantity, price, and risk of small business credits of $100K-$250K. We limit our investigation to the overall effects of SBCS technology because of the limited variation in survey responses for credits of this size. As examples, only eight banks reported using SBCS to set loan terms for loans of $100K-$250K, and only one bank used SBCS to automatically approve or reject these loans. The results, reported in Table 8 , indicate that the adoption of SBCS has no statistically significant effect on the quantity of small business credits of $100K-$250K (Panel 1). SBCS is negatively related to loan prices for these loans (Panel 2), but the effect is relatively small. The ADOPTED-SBCS 1 coefficient of Ϫ0.0014 implies that SBCS is associated with a difference in average loan premiums of Ϫ14 basis points, or Ϫ3.5% at the sample mean (Ϫ0.0014/0.0398). Similarly, SBCS is significantly associated with lower loan risk (Panel 3) but the effect is small. The predicted percentages for the safest to riskiest ratings are 1.89%, 8.28%, 47.50%, 38.78%, and 3.47% for a non-SBCS bank and 1.73%, 7.32%, 45.30%, 41.69%, and 3.96% for an SBCS bank using the contract-terms specification. These findings are consistent with little net change in lending at these larger credit sizes, and small reductions in average loan price and risk possibly due to small improvements in accuracy or slightly lower lending costs.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
The data suggest that SBCS is associated with expanded quantities, higher average prices, and greater average risk levels for small business credits under $100K after controlling for bank size and other differences across banks. In this section, we examine three alternative explanations of these main results, although we do not rule out other possibilities.
Significant Changes in Lending Behavior
First, the main results may primarily reflect significant changes in lending behavior following the adoption of SBCS. Banks may have increased their small business lending after adopting SBCS due to changes in lending costs and/or accuracy in evaluating creditworthiness. The net increase in lending may also reflect an increased ability to attract loan applicants or greater capacity to approve larger amounts of credit per applicant. The higher average prices and greater average risk levels may suggest that on average, scored credits are riskier because the net additional funding may be to riskier credits on average and/or risks may be increased due to a loss of underwriting accuracy on some credits that would have been approved in the absence of SBCS. Note that the changes in loan prices are net of any effects of changes in lending costs that may be passed through to borrowers.
The "Portfolio Substitution" Hypothesis
Another potential explanation of our main findings could be "portfolio substitution," or the process by which a bank might reclassify loans previously considered consumer loans. This could occur if firms obtained credit in the form of consumer loans to their owner prior to the introduction of SBCS. Thus, there may be no significant increase in bank lending, but instead some consumer loans are switched to the SBCS technology for evaluation and recorded as commercial loans. Our findings of higher prices and risks for banks that have adopted SBCS may in this case reflect that these converted consumer loans have higher prices and risks on average than other small business loans.
If the "portfolio substitution" hypothesis explains most of the observed increase in small business lending, then we would expect to find that SBCS is negatively associated with the quantity of consumer lending. Consumer lending would decrease by a similar magnitude to the increase in small business lending. To test the "portfolio substitution" hypothesis, we regress the ratio of total consumer loans to GTA on the explanatory variables that appear in Table 3 . For this test, we include all 95 identifiable banks with responses to the SBCS survey, rather than limiting ourselves to those with contract terms from the STBL. We find a positive, rather than negative coefficient on ADOPTED-SBCS 1, although the coefficient is not statistically significant (t-statistic ϭ 0.15, not shown in tables). These findings are not consistent with the "portfolio substitution" hypothesis.
The "Joint Determination" Problem
Another potential statistical explanation for our main findings might be that the decision to adopt SBCS and the quantities, prices, and risks of small business loans may be jointly determined to a significant degree by exogenous conditions for which we are not able to control. In this case, SBCS may have little effect on lending behavior, but the observed results may primarily reflect simultaneous-equations bias. For example, banks that have high small business lending ratios due to some unobserved local market conditions favorable to this type of lending may also choose to adopt SBCS to deal with this high volume of small business loans.
We deal with this potential problem in several ways. First, as discussed above, we use quantity, price, and risk data that are observed at least one year after the adoption of SBCS, when conditions have changed to some degree. Thus, we make it less likely that banks with high small business lending ratios for other reasons choose to adopt SBCS to deal with these loans by using only loan observations at least one year after adoption, and often well over one year after adoption. To illustrate, for the loan quantities regression for 1997, the banks that had adopted SBCS had been using it for 2.03 years on average.
Second, we note that as shown in Table 4 , there are significant measured bank learning curves, particularly for small business lending quantities and risk ratings. According to these estimates, much of the measured effects of SBCS do not occur until three years after adoption. It seems unlikely that what is causing these future effects after several years could be strongly related to conditions prior to SBCS adoption. Put another way, if high small business lending for other reasons were causing the banks to adopt the SBCS technology, we would have expected the high small business lending to have primarily occurred by the time of adoption, rather than several years later.
Third, we test for the "joint determination" problem directly by examining whether small business lending tends to predict SBCS adoption. If this problem was a primary explanation of our results, we would expect a significant positive relationship between ADOPTED-SBCS 1 and previous values of SBL-RATIO 1. We run this test two ways and summarize the results here (not shown in tables).
In the first test, we use a logit model and regress the dummy variable ADOPTED-SBCS 1 b,1997 on SBL-RATIO 1 b,1993 and all the control variables as of 1993, where ADOPTED-SBCS 1 b,1997 takes the value 1 if bank b adopted SBCS by the end of our sample, and SBL-RATIO 1 b,1993 is b's small business lending ratio as of 1993. For this test, we again include banks that respond to the SBCS without limiting ourselves to those with STBL contract terms. However, we do delete five banks that adopted SBCS prior to 1994 and another five with missing values for SBL-RATIO 1 b,1993 , leaving a total of 85 banks. We do not find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between prior small business lending and the decision to adopt SBCS-the t-statistic on the coefficient for SBL-RATIO 1 b,1993 is 0.60.
In the second test, we estimate logit regressions of ADOPTED-SBCS 1 b,t on SBL-RATIO 1 b,tϪ1 and the control variables as of t Ϫ 1, run separately for t ϭ 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 . For each of the four regressions, we exclude banks that have previously adopted SBCS. That is, each annual subsample includes banks that are capable of adopting the SBCS technology during the year, as they have not adopted it as yet. We do not find evidence of any statistically significant relationship between prior small business lending and the decision to adopt SBCS in any year-the t-statistics on the coefficients for SBL-RATIO 1 b,tϪ1 are 0.52, 0.16, 0.27, and 0.94, respectively.
Finally, we note that prior research also found no statistically significant effect of small business lending on either the probability or timing of adopting SBCS (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley, 2001, Akhavein, Frame, and White, 2005) . Thus, the articles of evidence presented here all suggest that the "joint determination" problem is not the primary explanation of our main empirical results.
CONCLUSIONS
We analyze the economic effects of SBCS, a rapidly spreading and potentially important financial technology. We examine the relationships between SBCS and the quantity, price, and risk of small business credit over the period 1995-97. Our application combines data from a survey of SBCS usage, a survey of individual bank loan contract terms and risk ratings, and several regulatory reports. Specifically, we test for the effects of SBCS on the availability, price, and risk of small business credits of different sizes, for bank-specific and industry learning curves, and for differences in the effects of SBCS based on how the technology is implemented ("rules" versus "discretion"). The prior empirical literature on SBCS tested only for the effects of SBCS on the availability of small business credit to one credit size category for one year.
The tests uncover a number of results that suggest that SBCS may have important effects on the small business lending behavior of banks that adopt the technology. The data suggest that SBCS is associated with expanded quantities, higher average prices, and greater average risk levels for small business credits under $100,000 after controlling for bank size and other differences across banks. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that use of the SBCS technology increases small business credit availability, primarily for relatively riskier firms that tend to pay relatively high prices for credit. These changes appear to occur primarily after some time has passed after individual banks and much of the industry adopted the SBCS technology, consistent with both bank-specific and industry learning curves. As well, the effects of SBCS appear to differ with how the technology is implemented. "Rules" banks that purchase scores and use them to set terms and automatically approve/reject credits tend to have significantly higher loan quantities and risks than non-scoring banks, whereas "discretion" banks that employ their own models and use other factors to set terms and approve/reject applicants tend to have similar quantities to and lower risks than non-scoring banks. "Rules" banks may be more likely to use SBCS as a substitute for existing lending technologies to reduce lending costs, whereas "discretion" banks may be more likely to use SBCS as a complement to other technologies to improve accuracy in evaluating creditworthiness. For credits of $100,000-$250,000, the data are associated with very little observed difference in lending behavior. We also show tests and other evidence that do not support two alternative explanations of the main results under which the findings primarily represent statistical artifacts, rather than significant changes in lending behavior.
The research findings may have a number of potentially important implications. First, they address the concern that the consolidation of the banking industry may reduce credit availability to some small businesses. This concern may be offset to some degree by SBCS, which appears to allow large banks to expand their small business lending, particularly to relatively risky credits. Second, in the long run, the use of SBCS may also help in the development of secondary markets for pools of small business debt, similar to the way in which consumer credit scoring helped in the development of secondary markets for consumer debt. 23 Third, SBCS may put increased competitive pressures on community banks in the long run, since SBCS may be used by banks of any size at any distance, and does not require the traditional local ties of community banks. Fourth, SBCS may raise questions about the appropriate geographic market definition for antitrust purposes. Traditionally, U.S. antitrust policy has focused on concentration in local banking markets, but SBCS does not require a local presence by the bank. Finally, issues of prudential supervision and regulation may arise in the long run if specialized lenders emerge that rely heavily on SBCS. Any systematic errors in the scoring models used by vendors could cause problems for numerous purchasing banks simultaneously. Such errors may include model misspecification as well as unrepresentative data (e.g., extrapolating to recessions using models estimated during expansions). These issues have already created concern in some segments of consumer lending (e.g., credit cards, mortgages).
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